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Rape and Force: The Forgotten Mens Rea
Kit Kinports*

I. INTRODUCTION

The crime of rape has traditionally been defined to
require proof of both force on the part of the defendant and
lack of consent on the part of the victim. In the words of
Blackstone, rape is "carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly
and against her will."1 This traditional "conjunction of
force and nonconsent"2 has recently been subject to a good
deal of criticism. While some commentators advocate that
the law of rape focus exclusively on the presence of force,
* Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. I am greatly indebted to

Nicole d'Arcambal for her valuable research assistance in connection with this
article and to Marcia Baron for her helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *210. For a
description of earlier English common law definitions of rape, which defined the
crime solely in terms of nonconsent, see infra note 155.
2. Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the
Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1780, 1792
(1992).
3. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 213.1 cmt. at 303, 280 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1980) (criticizing courts for placing "disproportionate
emphasis upon objective manifestations of non-consent" by the woman and
advocating instead a focus on "objective manifestations of aggression" by the
man); Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape 385 (1975)
(attributing the law's "belief that force ...is not conclusive in and of itself' and
its interest in "the victim's behavior during the offending act" to a desire "to
protect male interests") (emphasis omitted); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a
Feminist Theory of the State 245 (1989) (arguing that "[lack of consent is
redundant and should not be a separate element of the crime"; instead, "[r]ape
should be defined as sex by compulsion, of which physical force is one form");
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and the
Failure of Law 31-32 (1998) (observing that "nearly all the feminist reformers of
the 1970s concluded that the best course was to eliminate from the statutes all
references to the victim's consent and to focus instead on the conduct of the
assailant," thereby "draw[ing] attention away from what the victim might have
done and to make certain types of coercive conduct criminal in themselves"); Note,
Focusing on the Offender's Forceful Conduct: A Proposal for the Redefinition of
Rape Laws, 56 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 399, 401 (1988) (taking the position that the
criminal law should "shift the focus from the victim's nonconsent to the offender's
forceful or violent conduct").
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others believe that emphasis is more properly placed on the
absence of consent.4 Although they ultimately come to
different conclusions, these commentators agree with the
fundamental premise that requiring proof of both force and
lack

of consent

"redundant,"7

is

"arbitrary,"5 "indefensible,"'

and

and makes the criminal law
"underinclusive
8

in... protecting [women] against harm."

These views have made little headway. A handful of
state legislatures have made nonconsensual, nonforcible
intercourse a lesser offense than rape, 9 and the New Jersey
Supreme Court held in State ex rel. M.T.S. that the
statutory requirement of "physical force or coercion" could
be satisfied by proof of "nonconsensual penetration
4. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Real Rape 63 (1987) (noting that "the problem
with 'force' as a standard is... that the focus remains on the victim," and thus
"the conclusion that no force is present emerges not as a judgment that the man
acted reasonably, but as a judgment that the woman victim did not"); Schulhofer,
supra note 3, at 11, 32-33 (observing that "[t]he criminal law's continuing fixation
on force means that... sexual autonomy-the right to self-determination in
matters of sexual life-is not directly guaranteed" and describing a few rape
statutes that make "nonconsent the central element of the offense"); John H.
Bogart, Commodification and Phenomenology: Evading Consent in Theory
Regarding Rape, 2 Legal Theory 253, 258 (1996) (endorsing a "consent-based
theory ofrape"); Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 Law & Phil. 127,
158 (1992) (arguing that 'force' should not be a necessary requirement to
transform heterosexual intercourse into rape"). Cf. Lucinda Vandervort, Mistake
of Law and Sexual Assault: Consent and Mens Rea, 2 Can. J. Women & L. 233,
303 (1987-88) (noting that the Canadian Parliament revised its sexual assault
statute so as to define the crime in terms ofnonconsent rather than force).
5. Dripps, supra note 2, at 1792.
6. Robin West, A Comment on Consent, Sex, and Rape, 2 Legal Theory 233,
233 (1996).
7. MacKinnon, supra note 3, at 172.
8. Joan McGregor, Why When She Says No She Doesn't Mean Maybe and
Doesn't Mean Yes: A Critical Reconstruction of Consent, Sex, and the Law, 2
Legal Theory 175, 181 (1996) (advocating that either the use of force or the failure
to obtain affirmative consent should suffice for criminal liability).
9. For a list of such statutes, see infra note 29. But cf. Schulhofer, supra
note 3, at 71 (observing that while such statutes "fillo] an important part of the
gap [and] appear] to eliminate the problem entirely,... the conundrums of the
force requirement are not so easily avoided"). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Prince,
719 A.2d 1086, 1089 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (upholding a conviction under such a
statute, and complimenting the jury's "apparent thoughtfulness" in reaching its
verdict, even though the jury acquitted the defendant of rape on evidence that
suggested the presence of force as well as absence of consent).
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involving no more force than necessary to accomplish that
result." ° But the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in
this country continue to require proof of both force and lack
of consent to support a rape conviction. 1
A parallel debate has surrounded the mens rea
requirements that apply in rape cases.
Although the
traditional definition of rape was silent on the question of
mens rea, the issue came to the fore in the House of Lords'
12
1975 ruling in Directorof Public Prosecutions v. Morgan.
By a four-to-three margin, the Lords held that a rape
conviction could not stand if the defendant "in fact believed
that the woman consented, [even] if such belief was not
based on reasonable grounds." 3 The House of Lords'
decision generated tremendous controversy, with critics
arguing that a "man who has the inherent capacity to act
reasonably but fails to has, through that failure, made a
blameworthy choice for which he can justly be punished." 4
10. 609 A.2d 1266, 1267 (N.J. 1992). Some commentators have criticized the
New Jersey Supreme Court for "act[ing] as a super-legislature" and "effectively
redraft[ing] the statute." Joshua Dressier, Where We Have Been, and Where We
Might Be Going: Some Cautionary Reflections on Rape Law Reform, 46 Clev. St.
L. Rev. 409, 422 (1998); see also Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 96 (same).
Moreover, the approach taken in M.T.S. has been expressly rejected by a number
of other courts. See, e.g., Gibbins v. State, 495 S.E.2d 46, 48 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)
(observing that "[i]n the ordinary case the [required] force... is not the force
inherent in the act of penetration but is the force used to overcome the resistance
of the female"); State v. Dye, 695 N.E.2d 763, 765-66 (Ohio 1998) (interpreting the
Ohio rape statute to require that "some amount of force must be proven beyond
that force inherent in the crime itself'); Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d
1161, 1164-65 (Pa. 1994) (finding "a legislative intent that the term 'forcible
compulsion'... be interpreted as something more than a lack of consent").
11. See Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ll. L.
Rev. 953, 1000-01 (citing a number of statutes that include only force in their
definition of rape, and a few that include only nonconsent, but concluding that
"Id]espitethese formal differences .. , in most jurisdictions... [i]f one, but not the
other, is present, the sexual act is not rape").
12. [19761 App. Cas. 182 (appeal taken from Eng. Ct. App.).
13. Id. at 205. The controversy created by the House of Lords' decision
ultimately led to adoption of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act of 1976,
section 1(1) of which provides that "a man commits rape if (a) he has unlawful
sexual intercourse with a woman who.., does not consent to it; and (b) at the
time he knows that she does not consent to the intercourse or he is reckless as to
whether she consents to it."
14. Estrich, supra note 4, at 97; see also Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know:
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On the other hand, the decision's supporters responded
that "[t]o convict the stupid man would be to convict him
for what lawyers call inadvertent negligence," something
for which "[p]eople ought not to be punished... except in
some minor offences established by statute." 5
In this country, a number of jurisdictions have sided
with Morgan's critics, following the California Supreme
Court's lead in People v. Mayberry and recognizing a
defense only where the defendant's mistaken belief in the
victim's consent was both honest and reasonable. 16 And a
few jurisdictions have refused to attach any mens rea
requirement to the element of nonconsent, believing that
"[tihe crux of the offense" is force and lack of consent and
thus, absent some indication to the contrary from the
legislature, even an honest, reasonable mistake is no
defense.

17

Honoring Women in Law and in Fact, 2 Tex. J. Women & L. 41, 67 (1993)
(advocating that "the minimum culpable mens rea as to consent should be
negligence"); Toni Pickard, Culpable Mistakes and Rape: Relating Mens Rea to
the Crime, 30 U. Toronto L.J. 75, 77 (1980) (observing that "it is a major harm for
a woman to be subjected to non-consensual intercourse notwithstanding that the
man may believe he has her consent," and thus "the cost of taking reasonable care
is insignificant compared with the harm which can be avoided through its
exercise"). Cf. Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 258-59 (endorsing this view so long as
"the law provides safeguards comparable to those it affords in negligent homicide
cases: the defendant's conduct must involve a gross departure from the level of
care reasonably expected, and the penalty must be substantially lower than that
which applies to intentional misconduct"). But cf. David P. Bryden, Redefining
Rape, 3 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 317, 341 (2000) (commenting that "[iun rape cases, the
distinctions among intentions, recklessness, and negligence are at best
exceedingly thin").
15. Glanville Williams, Lords' Decision on the Law of Rape, London Times,
May 8, 1975, at 15.
16. 542 P.2d 1337, 1344-46 (Cal. 1975). See generally Joshua Dressler,
Understanding Criminal Law § 33.05, at 545 (2d ed. 1995) (describing the
approach taken in Mayberry as the "general rule" in this country).
17. Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 A.2d 765, 769 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); see
also Commonwealth v. Ascolillo, 541 N.E.2d 570, 575 (Mass. 1989) (same). Cf.
Commonwealth v. Fischer, 721 A.2d 1111, 1114-18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998), appeal
dismissed, 745 A.2d 1214 (Pa. 2000) (questioning whether the approach taken in
Williams ought to apply in date-rape cases where the victim did not resist). But
cf. Beverly Bales & Mary Louise Fellows, Guilty of the Crime of Trust:
Nonstranger Rape, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 599, 606, 607 (1991) (advocating that
acquaintance rape should be a matter of strict liability on the grounds that
"familiarity encourages a woman to be less wary" and thus creates a "heightened
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What remains largely ignored in these two parallel
debates is the relationship between them. Although the
actus reus of rape has two critical components-force and
absence of consent-issues of mens rea have revolved
almost exclusively around the element of nonconsent, that
is, the defendant's state of mind with respect to the victim's
consent. Very little attention has been paid to the mens
rea applicable to the element of force, that is, the
defendant's state of mind with respect to the presence of
force. For example, in discussing the types of mens rea
issues that arise in rape cases, one commentary noted that
"the mistake-of-fact defense in a rape prosecution is almost
always that the actor thought the victim had consented"
and then dropped a footnote to make the point that "[it is
highly unlikely that a defendant would be mistaken about
whether he is having intercourse"-thus completely
ignoring the question of mens rea as applied to the element
of force. 18 Another commentator explained that questions
of mens rea have begun to surface only recently in rape
cases because historically "[als a practical matter, the actus
reus proved the mens rea"--that is, "[i]f a male used or
threatened force to obtain intercourse, then it was evident
that he purposely or knowingly had nonconsensual sexual
relations'-but then went on to discuss the mens rea issues
that have arisen only in terms of nonconsent and not in
terms of force.1"
duty [which] justifies conviction if... the defendant failed to obtain the victim's
consent regardless of the defendant's reasonable or good faith belief); Henderson,
supra note 14, at 68 (proposing that "the law impose strict liability as soon as the
woman says no or indicates that she does not want to engage in sexual activity").
18. Douglas N. Husak & George C. Thomas HI,Date Rape, Social Convention,
and Reasonable Mistakes, 11 Law & Phil. 95, 98 & n.11 (1992).
19. Dressier, supra note 10, at 431-32; see also Christine L.M. Boyle, Sexual
Assault 76 (1984) (discussing the question whether rape defendants must be
shown to have intentionally used force, or whether recklessness suffices, and
noting that "[t]his aspect of the mens rea is not an issue in practical terms");
Dressler, supra note 16, § 33.05, at 545 (observing that rape is usually considered
a general intent crime, such that the defendant must "possess a morally
blameworthy state of mind regarding the female's lack of consent"); Bryden,
supra note 14, at 325 (noting that, "[judging by the reported cases, the mens rea
issue usually arises by way of defense, when the defendant claims to have been
mistaken about the woman's consent"); Vandervort, supra note 4, at 234
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In rape cases involving physical violence or express
threats of physical harm, proof of the actus reus obviously
does establish mens rea with respect to force as well as
nonconsent. A defendant who beat or threatened to kill his
victim could hardly raise a plausible argument that he did
not know he was using force. But in other circumstances,
the defendant's mens rea vis-a-vis force may be less clear,
and it may therefore make a difference whether a rape
conviction requires proof that the defendant purposely
intended to use force, or whether it is enough that he knew
he was exercising force, that the woman thought he was
using force, or that a reasonable person viewing the
situation would have thought So. 20 Given the traditional
criminal law assumption that a mens rea requirement
attaches to every material element of a crime,21 it seems
odd that so little attention has been paid to the question of
what mens rea, if any, attaches to the force element.
Admittedly, a handful of courts have paid lip service to
this issue, and their opinions are described below in Part
II. But the overwhelming majority of court decisions and
commentaries discussing mens rea and rape have focused
exclusively on the defendant's beliefs and mistakes about
the victim's consent. As explained in Part III, this almost
universal disregard of mens rea issues as applied to the
(commenting that, "aside from cases of mistake involving minors, all culpability

questions which are problematic in rape and sexual assault cases arise in relation
to the matter of consent").
20. For specific examples of such cases, see infra notes 125-30 and
accompanying text.
21. See Model Penal Code § 2.02 cmt. at 231 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1980) (explaining that "[tihe Model Code's approach is based upon the
view that clear analysis requires that the question of the kind of culpability
required to establish the commission of an offense be faced separately with
respect to each material element of the crime"). See generally Paul H. Robinson
& Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model
Penal Code and Beyond, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 681, 683, 757-58 (1983) (noting that
although a majority of state legislatures have adopted the Model Penal Code's
"element analysis" of mens rea, the courts, "[diulled by generations of offense
analysis, ... continue to define unstated culpability requirements according to
their own view of the public policy interests," with "[tihe result.., that in nearly
every criminal case in the United States the statement of the law defining the
offense charged suffers a significant risk ofinaccuracy").
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element of force confirms the redundancy of the force
requirement, once absence of consent and its accompanying
mens rea have been established.
II. THE EXCEPTIONS
Despite the general tendency on the part of both
judges and commentators to ignore mens rea questions in
connection with the element of force, courts have
occasionally made reference to this issue. As explained
below, there is substantial disparity among them as to
what sort of mens rea requirement they purport to attach
to the force requirement running the gamut from purpose
to strict liability. But even in the rare case where the issue
is discussed, there is no evidence that the courts' choice of
mens rea has any real impact on the outcome of the case.
In fact, the few courts that mentioned mens rea in
discussing the force requirement typically go on to ignore
completely that issue in disposing of the case. Before
describing these opinions in Part B, Part A briefly
summarizes the rape statutes currently in effect in the
various jurisdictions in this country, focusing on any mens
rea requirements they impose.
A. The Statutes
Adhering to traditional formulations of the crime,22 the
overwhelming majority of contemporary rape statutes
contain no explicit mens rea requirement. 23 The greatest
number of them define the crime to encompass intercourse
that has been coerced or compelled by force or the threat of
22. See supra text accompanying note 1.
23. The list below includes the statutory provision in each jurisdiction that
comes closest to the traditional definition of forcible rape. Thus, it excludes both
aggravated rape statutes that cover, for example, sexual assaults that caused
serious bodily harm or involved the use of a weapon and statutes that go beyond
the traditional formulation by criminalizing fraud, deception, threats of
nonphysical force, and abuses of trust or authority. For an extensive discussion of
the latter statutes, see Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64
Brooklyn L. Rev. 39 (1998).
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force.24 Some are phrased in slightly different, but similar
terms-prohibiting, for example, intercourse by forcible
compulsion, 25 intercourse by force or coercion, 26 or
intercourse by force and against the will of the victim. 27 A
few are phrased simply in terms of force,2 and a few others
24. Alaska Stat. §§ 11.41.410, 11.41.470(8)(A) (Michie 1998); Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 53a-70 (West Supp. 2000); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 794.011(3)-(4) (West 2000);
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3502 (Supp. 1999) ("overcome by force or fear"); Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, §§ 253, 251(1)(E) (West Supp. 1999); Mass. Ann. Laws ch.
265, § 22(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 750.520d,
750.520b(1)(f) (West 1991); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-319, 28-318(8) (1995); N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 632-P-2 (1996); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-20-03 (1997); Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 21, § 1114 (West Supp. 2000); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-37-2, 11-37-1(2) (1994 &
Supp. 1999); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-402, 76-5-406 (1999 & Supp. 2000); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 940.225(2)(a) (West Supp. 1999) ("without consent.., by use or
threat of force or violence"); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(ii) (Michie 1999); see also
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 3252 (1998) ("[c]ompels the other person to participate in a
sexual act: (A) [wvithout the consent of the other person; or (B) [by threatening or
coercing the other person; or (C) [by placing the other person in fear that any
person will suffer imminent bodily injury").
25. Ala. Code § 13A-6-61 (1994); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-103 (Michie 1997); Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 510.040 (Michie 1996); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 566.030 (West 1999);
N.Y. Penal Law § 130.35 (McKinney 1998); Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.375 (1999); 18 Pa.
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3121 (West Supp. 2000); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.44.050
(West 2000); W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-8B-4 (Michie 1997).
26. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.344 (West Supp. 2000); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-2
(West Supp. 2000); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-11(E) (Michie Supp. 2000); S.C. Code
Ann. § 16-3-654 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-22-1 (Michie Supp.
2000); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-503 (1997).
27. Cal. Penal Code § 261(a)(2) (West 1999) ("accomplished against a person's
will by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of immediate and
unlawful bodily injury"); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-1 (1999) ("forcibly and against her
will"); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 463 (1996) ("[by force or threat of force against
the will and without the consent of the other person"); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.3
(1999) ("by force and against the will of the other person"); Va. Code Ann. § 18.261 (Michie Supp. 2000) ("against the complaining witness's will, by force, threat
or intimidation"). Cf. Iowa Code Ann. § 709.1 (West 1993) ("by force or against
the will of the [victim]"); see also Idaho Code § 18-6101 (Michie Supp. 2000)
("[w]here she resists but her resistance is overcome by force or violence" or
"[w]here she is prevented from resistance by threats of immediate and great
bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution"); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
14:42.1 (West Supp. 2000) ("the victim is prevented from resisting the act by force
or threats of physical violence under circumstances where the victim reasonably
believes that such resistance would not prevent the rape").
28. D.C. Code Ann. § 22-4102 (Supp. 2000) ("engages in a sexual act... [by
using force [or] [by threatening or placing (the victim] in reasonable fear" of
death, bodily injury, or kidnapping); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-13 (Supp. 2000)
("sexual penetration by the use of force or threat of force"). In both of these
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simply prohibit intercourse without consent.29 In none of
these formulations is any mental state requirement
specified.
Nevertheless, there are a handful of exceptions.
Several statutes appear to require proof of knowledge." A
jurisdictions, however, consent is expressly recognized as a defense. See D.C.
Code Ann. § 22-4107 (1996); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-17(a) (1993).
29. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-95 (2000) ("engages in sexual penetration with...
[another person without.., consent"); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.366 (Supp. 1999)
("subjects another person to sexual penetration... against the will of the
victim"). See Sanders v. State, 586 So. 2d 792, 796 (Miss. 1991) (noting that while
"force or violence are elements that a jury could consider in determining whether
the victim consented," "that doesn't mean that force or reasonable apprehension
of force are necessary elements of the crime," and therefore approving jury
instructions indicating that proof of force or violence was unnecessary); McNair v.
State, 825 P.2d 571, 574 (Nev. 1992) (observing that the Nevada rape statute
.only requires the commission of the act of sexual penetration against the will of
the victim," and therefore "[pihysical force is not a necessary element in the
commission of the crime of rape).
For illustrations of statutes creating lesser offenses for intercourse
without consent, see Ala. Code § 13A-6-65 (1994) (defining the crime of sexual
misconduct as intercourse occurring "without [the victim's] consent"); Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 794.011(5) (West 2000) ("without that person's consent"); Mo. Ann. Stat. §
566.040 (West 1999) ("sexual intercourse with another person knowing that he
does so without that person's consent"); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-20-07(1)(a) (1997)
("knowingly has sexual contact" and "knows or has reasonable cause to believe
that the contact is offensive to the other person"); Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.425 (1999)
("[slubjects another person to sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse or...
penetration... and the victim does not consent thereto"); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 3124.1 (West Supp. 2000) (defining the offense of sexual assault as "sexual
intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse... without the complainant's consent");
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.44.060 (West 2000) (creating a lesser offense where
"the victim did not consent.., and such lack of consent was clearly expressed by
the victim's words or conduct"); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.225(3) (West Supp. 1999)
(defining third-degree sexual assault to encompass any sexual intercourse or
contact "without the consent" of the victim).
30. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1406 (Supp. 1999) ("intentionally or knowingly
engaging in sexual intercourse... without consent"); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-3402 (West 1999) ("knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion or sexual penetration... if:
(a) [tihe actor causes submission of the victim through the actual application of
physical force or physical violence; or (b) [tihe actor causes submission of the
victim by threat of imminent death, serious bodily harm, extreme pain, or
kidnapping"); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 707-730 (Michie 1999) ("knowingly subjects
another person to an act of sexual penetration by strong compulsion"); Ind. Code
Ann. § 35-42-4-1 (West Supp. 2000) ("knowingly or intentionally has sexual
intercourse with a member of the opposite sex when: (1) the other person is
compelled by force or imminent threat of force"); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-503
(1997) ("knowingly has sexual intercourse without consent"); Tex. Penal Code
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few others are phrased so as to imply a requirement of
But in the vast majority of jurisdictions, the
purpose.
statutory definitions of rape do not contain an explicit
mental state requirement, leaving the question of mens rea
to the judiciary. The next section therefore turns to the
courts.
B. The Cases
As outlined above, judges-like legislators-have
tended to ignore the question of mens rea as applied to the
force requirement in rape cases. Nevertheless, there are a
number of cases in which courts have wrestled with this
issue. Although they have reached different conclusions, a
common thread running through most of these decisions is
that the question of mens rea is rarely outcomedeterminative. Rather, the cases tend to be resolved on
some basis other than the nature of the defendant's mens
rea vis-a-vis force. In analyzing these cases, the discussion
below catalogues them according to what mens rea
requirement they purport to apply.
1. Purpose/Intention
A few courts have suggested that the strictest mens
rea requirement attaches to the element of force in rape
cases-that is, the prosecution must prove that the
defendant purposefully or intentionally used force. Not
Ann. § 22.011 (Vernon Supp. 2000) ("intentionally or knowingly: (A) causes...
penetration... without [the victim's] consent"); see also Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
2907.03 (Anderson 1999) (creating the lesser offense of sexual battery where the
defendant "knowingly coerces the other person to submit by any means that
would prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resolution").
31. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 772 (Supp. 1998) ("[ilntentionally engages in
sexual intercourse with another person, and the intercourse occurs without the
victim's consent"); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.02 (Anderson 1999) ("purposely
compels the other person to submit by force or threat of force"); see also Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(i) (Michie 1999) (alternative formulation of first-degree
sexual assault statute, defining the crime as "caus[ing] submission of the victim
through the actual application, reasonably calculated to cause submission of the
victim, of physical force or forcible confinement") (emphasis added).
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surprisingly-given the express reference to "purpose" in
its rape statute3 2-Ohio is one such jurisdiction.3 3 Thus, in
State v. Martens, the Ohio Court of Appeals noted that a
rape conviction requires proof that the defendant had "the
specific intent to purposely compel the victim to submit by
force or threat of force."3 4 But the court's opinion went on
simply to approve of the definition of "purpose" contained
in the jury instructions given at the defendant's trial
without applying the mens rea requirement to the facts of
the case. 5
The question of mens rea was directly at issue,
however, in another Ohio case, State v. Martin, where the
defendant's sole ground for appeal was that "the
prosecution failed to prove that he possessed the requisite
culpable mental state."36 The appellate court noted that
Ohio case law had established that "a defendant purposely
compels his victim to submit by force or threat of force
when he uses physical force against the victim, or creates
the belief that physical force will be used if the victim does
not submit," and that "[tihe requisite force need not be
overt and physically brutal, but can be subtle and
psychological." 37 The court explained that a "two step
analysis [was] required to determine if Martin acted
purposely under the rape statute."38 But neither step
directly involved the defendant's state of mind: The first
step was "to determine whether Martin engaged in sexual
conduct" with the victim, and the second was "to determine
whether he compelled her to submit by force or threat of
force. ' 9 In rejecting the defendant's claim and concluding
that the trial judge could have reasonably found that
Martin "purposely compelled [the victim] to submit.., by
32. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.02 (Anderson 1999) ("purposely compels
the other person to submit by force or threat of force").
33. See State v. Schaim, 600 N.E.2d 661, 665 (Ohio 1992).
34. 629 N.E.2d 462, 469 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
35. See id. at 469-70.
36. 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2078, at '2 (Ohio Ct. App. May 17, 1995).
37. Id. at *5-6.
38. Id. at *4.
39. Id.
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force or threat of force," the court noted that he "wrapped
his arms around [the victim], pinning her body underneath
him," when she tried to push him away, that the victim was
young, and that there was a disparity between them in
terms of age, power, size, and weight.40 The court was
thereby able to dispose of the case without really discussing
the defendant's state of mind, but instead by focusing on
the evidence of force and thus talking in terms of actus
reus rather than mens rea.
In an earlier case, however, the Ohio Court of Appeals
did address the question of mens rea vis-a-vis force in more
direct fashion. In that case, State v. Wilkens, the court
reversed a rape conviction on the grounds that the trial
judge had erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the
lesser-included offense of sexual battery, a charge
distinguishable from rape in that it requires a mens rea of
knowledge rather than purpose. 41 Although the court
thought the evidence "overwhelmingly established that
appellant had, by threat or use of force, engaged in sexual
conduct" with the victim, it also believed that "the jury
could have reasonably concluded from the evidence that
appellant retained a 'knowing' mens rea, rather than a
'purposeful' mens rea."42 Specifically, the court reasoned
that the following evidence might have convinced the jury
that the defendant had acted knowingly, but not
purposefully: that the victim had known the defendant for
five years; that she "voluntarily walked over to [his] house
at sometime shortly after midnight"; that a neighbor who
heard the incident "at first thought he was simply
overhearing a 'family affair"; and that the defendant
testified that "he had engaged in consensual sexual
relations with [the victim] in the past and, on this occasion,
she had been the aggressor and had teased both him and
40. Id. at *6-7.
41. 1980 Ohio App. LEXIS 13745, at *11 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 17, 1980). See
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.03 (Anderson 1999) (defining sexual battery to cover
situations where the defendant "knowingly coerces the other person to submit by
any means that would prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resolution").
42. Wilkens, 1980 Ohio App. LEXIS 13745, at *14, *12.
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earlier his cousin.' 4 Although the court did not explain
exactly how this evidence could have led to the jury to
convict the defendant on a sexual battery charge, it may
have thought that the prior friendly relationship between
the parties suggested that the defendant may not have
wanted to compel the victim to submit, even though he was
aware that he was doing so."
A few other courts seem to have endorsed a mens rea
requirement of purpose despite the absence of statutory
language mandating that result. In State v. Rusk, for
example, the Maryland Court of Appeals indicated that the
force requirement could be satisfied "'without violence,"' so
long as "'the acts and threats of the defendant were
reasonably calculated to create in the mind of the victim...
a real apprehension... of imminent bodily harm.' 45 The
43. Id. at 13-14.
44. Aside from Ohio, Delaware is the only other state whose rape statute
expressly suggests a mens rea requirement of purpose. The Delaware rape
statute includes the mens rea term "intentionally," although the wording of that
statute makes it less clear precisely what elements of the crime the term
modifies. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 772 (Supp. 1998) ("[ilntentionally engages
in sexual intercourse with another person, and the intercourse occurs without the
victim's consent"); id. § 761(h)(1) (defining "without consent" to include cases
where "Itihe defendant compelled the victim to submit" by coercion, force, threat,
or "any other means which would compel a reasonable person under the
circumstances to submit"). In Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1987), the
Delaware Supreme Court made the observation that, "[wlhile the State does have
the burden of proving intent, as an element of the offense of rape first degree, the
requisite state of mind is demonstrated by proof of the defendants 'conscious
object to engage in conduct of that nature.'" Id. at 733 (quoting Del. Code Ann. tit.
11, § 231(a)(1)). But the court provided no further analysis or explanation of the
mens rea requirement or its applicability to the element of force, disposing of the
case by ruling that evidence of the defendant's prior sexual contact with his
daughter was inadmissible.
45. 424 A.2d 720, 726 (Md. 1981) (quoting Hazel v. State, 157 A.2d 922, 925
(Md. 1960)) (emphasis added). The court's use of the word "reasonably" creates
some confusion by suggesting a negligence mens rea, while the term "calculated"
connotes purpose. The dissenting opinion in Rusk lends support to the latter
interpretation, observing that the victim "must resist unless the defendant has
objectively manifested his intent to use physical force to accomplish his purpose."
Id. at 733 (Cole, J., dissenting); see also Martin v. State, 686 A.2d 1130, 1159 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (affirming the trial court's finding that the defendant
.reasonably intended to create the circumstances that produced [the victim's]
reasonable fear of physical harm," noting that he "'deliberately placed the victim
in a situation where she would be afraid, with the expectation she would thereby
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court later commented that the jury could reasonably have

found that "the taking of [the victim's] car keys was
intended by Rusk to immobilize her alone, late at night, in

a neighborhood with which she was not familiar.""

But

aside from that brief reference, the court ignored the mens
rea issue in finding sufficient evidence of force to support
Rusk's conviction. In explaining its decision, the court
placed "particular focus" on the fact that the defendant "put

his hands on [the victim's] throat and began 'lightly to
choke' her,"47 without addressing the question of what his

state of mind was at that particular moment and without
responding to the appellate court's observation that "the
'light choking' could have been a heavy caress."48

yield to his lustful demands without physical resistance'") (emphasis added)
(quoting Walter v. State, 264 A.2d 882, 887 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970)); Chavez v.
State, 601 P.2d 166, 172 (Wyo. 1979) (interpreting a statutory provision
containing the "reasonably calculated" language, see supra note 31, and finding
insufficient evidence of the defendant's "intent to cause submission by forcible
confinement").
46. Rusk, 424 A.2d at 728 (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. Rusk v. State, 406 A.2d 624, 628 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979), rev'd, 424 A.2d
720 (Md. 1981); see also Estrich, supra note 4, at 65-66 (criticizing the court's
"emphasis on the light choking/heavy caresses," commenting that "[ilt was not the
only force that produced [the] moment," but "the only force that a schoolboy might
recognize").
Several California appellate court opinions have likewise suggested that a
rape conviction requires proof of "the intent to sexually penetrate the victim and
the intent to accomplish that act by force or fear." People v. Balcom, 1 Cal. Rptr.
2d 879, 885 (Ct. App. 1991), affd on other grounds, 867 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1994);
People v. Burnham, 222 Cal. Rptr. 630, 635 (Ct. App. 1986); see also People v.
Tassell, 679 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1984) (Reynoso, J., concurring and dissenting)
(same). But the question of mens rea vis-a-vis force did not figure in the
disposition of those cases, as Balcom involved the admissibility of the defendant's
prior rape conviction, see 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 883-86, and Burnham turned on the
court's analysis of the defendant's mistake of fact defense concerning nonconsent,
not force, see 222 Cal. Rptr. at 634-42. Moreover, more recent California case law
treats rape as a general intent crime. See infra note 92.
For a description of another case that seems to require proof of a
purposeful use of force, see the discussion of People v. Evans infra at notes 113-16
and accompanying text.
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2. Knowledge
Other courts have suggested that less stringent mens
rea requirements apply to the force requirement in rape
cases. Some have apparently endorsed a knowledge mens
rea, including courts in three states-Hawaii, Indiana, and
Texas-where the rape statutes expressly support that
requirement.49
In State v. Keomany,0 for example, the Hawaii
Intermediate Court of Appeals noted that its first-degree
sexual assault statute makes it a crime to "knowingly
subject[] another person to an act of sexual penetration by
strong compulsion."'
The defendant in that case
challenged the instructions given to the jury, arguing that
they failed to indicate that "the specified state of mind,
'knowingly,' applied to each element of the offense."52 The
appellate court agreed that "strong compulsion" was an
attendant circumstance element of the crime and thus
required proof of knowledge. 3 But the court then focused
on the defendant's state of mind vis-a-vis lack of consent,
not compulsion, noting that mens rea would be established
and the defendant would be deemed to have "acted
knowingly with respect to the relevant attendant
circumstanceD if... he was aware Complainant did not
consent."
And the court disposed of the case by
concluding that the jury instructions were adequate,
without evaluating how the mens rea requirement applied
49. See supra note 30. For a description of the relevant case law in the three
other states whose statutes seem to require proof of knowledge, see infra note 65.

50. 2000 Haw. App. LEXIS 112 (Haw. Ct. App. June 5, 2000), cert. granted,
2000 Haw. LEXIS 222 (Haw. July 7, 2000).
51. Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 707-730(1)(a) (Michie 1999); see also id. § 707-700
(defining "strong compulsion" as "the use or attempt to use" either "physical
force," a "dangerous instrument," or a threat of bodily injury or kidnapping "to
overcome" the victim).
52. Keomany, 2000 Haw. App. LEXIS 112, at *14.
53. See id. at *16-17, 21. Cf. State v. Arceo, 928 P.2d 843, 857 (Haw. 1996)
(noting that the crime of third-degree sexual assault, a form of statutory rape,
requires proof of knowledge of the attendant circumstance that the defendant was
not married to the victim).
54. Keomany, 2000 Haw. App. LEXIS 112, at *17.

770

BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:755

55
to the facts before it.

Similarly, in Tyson v. State, the Indiana Court of
Appeals approved jury instructions that, mirroring the
state's rape statute, required the prosecution to prove that
the defendant "knowingly or intentionally used force to
have sexual contact with [the victim] when [she] was
compelled by the force."55 But the court's discussion arose
in the context of evaluating the defendant's alleged mistake
of fact about the victim's consent and not his mens rea with
respect to force.
The Texas sexual assault statute likewise requires
proof that the defendant "intentionally or knowingly...
cause[d] the penetration" of the victim "without that
person's consent." It then goes on to define lack of consent
to include circumstances where a defendant "compels the
other person to submit or participate by the use of physical
force or violence" or "by threatening to use force or violence
[where] the other person believes that the [defendant] has
the present ability to execute the threat." 9 The wording of
the statute makes it unclear precisely what elements the
mens rea terms "intentionally or knowingly" modify. In
Murray v. State, however, the Texas Court of Appeals
suggested that the mens rea requirements apply to the use
of force.60 In that case, the court upheld jury instructions
that advised the jurors to return a guilty verdict if they
found that the defendant had intercourse with the victim
"intentionally or knowingly, by the use of physical force or
violence or by threatening to use force or violence... and
without the [victim's] consent."6' The appellate court
explained that criminal statutes can contain one or more of
55. See id. at *7-27.
56. 619 N.E.2d 276, 298 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). For a description of an Indiana
opinion taking a different view of the requisite mens rea, see the discussion of
Tobias v. State infra at notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
57. See Tyson, 619 N.E.2d at 292-98.
58. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.011(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2000); see also id. §
22.021(a)(1) (using identical language in defining aggravated sexual assault).
59. Id. § 22.011(b)(1)-(2).
60. 804 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
61. Id. at 280.
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three types of "conduct elements"-those involving the
nature of the defendant's conduct, the results of that
conduct, or the circumstances surrounding the conduct.
Although the court ultimately thought it unclear whether
the crime of sexual assault was defined simply in terms of
the nature of a defendant's conduct or also its results,6 2 the
court observed that "it is those essential 'conduct elements'
to which a culpable mental state must apply."6 3 But this

discussion appeared in the course of the court's analysis of
the defendant's challenge to jury instructions that
generally defined the terms "intentionally" and
"knowingly," and the court therefore had no need to
determine whether the defendant in that case had
intentionally or knowingly used force.',
62. Cf. Cook v. State, 884 S.W.2d 485, 493 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)
(Maloney, J., concurring) (noting that, for the crime of aggravated sexual assault,
.causes the penetration" could be considered either a result element or a pure
conduct element, while lack of consent could be deemed either a circumstance or a
conduct element); Redo v. State, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 2382, at *2 (Tex. Ct. App.
Feb. 27, 1998) (observing that "[w]hether aggravated sexual assault is a natureof-conduct or result-of-conduct or combined offense has not been definitively
settled"). But cf. Myers v. State, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 410, at *11-12 (Tex. Ct.
App. Jan. 31, 1997) (taking the position in a case involving charges of aggravated
sexual assault of a child that "the nature of appellant's conduct and the result of
the conduct are the same-contact or penetration of [the victim's sexual organ").
63. Murray, 804 S.W.2d at 281.
64. The defendant maintained that the trial judge "should have limited the
definition of the term 'intentionally' to the results of his conduct as opposed to the
nature of his conduct." Id. at 280.
65. Although the rape statutes in three other states-Arizona, Colorado, and
Montana-also seem to require proof of knowledge, see supra note 30, the case
law in those jurisdictions is less clear. In State v. White, 770 P.2d 328 (Ariz.
1989), the Arizona Supreme Court noted that the state's sexual assault statute
requires proof that the defendant "intentionally or knowingly engaged in nonconsensual sexual intercourse.'" Id. at 338 (quoting State v. Rybolt, 650 P.2d
1258, 1263 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982)). But it did so in the context of upholding the
trial court's decision to impose consecutive sentences for burglary and sexual
assault, and therefore offered no further explanation of the mens rea required for
sexual assault. Moreover, in State v. Cartwright, 746 P.2d 478, 482 (Ariz. 1987),
the court listed the three elements of sexual assault as follows: "1) [elngaging in
sexual intercourse.., with another person; 2) [k]nowingly; 3) [a]nd without
consent of such person." In finding sufficient evidence of mens rea in that case,
the court noted that "[diefendant's participation in the intercourse creates a
presumption that he did so knowingly," citing in support State v. Jamison, 517
P.2d 1241, 1244 (Ariz. 1974), for the proposition that "general intent [is]

772

BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:755

A few courts have attached a knowledge mens rea to
the element of force despite the absence of statutory
language supporting that choice. In State v. Ayer, for
example, the New Hampshire Supreme Court noted that
the state's rape statute contained no express mens rea
requirement and therefore turned for guidance to 'the
common-law origins of the crime.""' Observing that rape
was historically considered a general intent crime, and that
the New Hampshire legislature had followed the Model
presumed from the commission of the crime itself." 746 P.2d at 483; see also
State v. Williams, 554 P.2d 646, 651 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (describing rape as a
general intent crime).
In Chambers v. People, 682 P.2d 1173 (Colo. 1984), the Colorado Supreme
Court observed that "[tihe offense of first degree sexual assault requires that the
actor have an awareness of his conduct and of the circumstance of the nonconsent
of his victim." Id. at 1178; see also People v. Krovarz, 697 P.2d 378, 383 (Colo.
1985) (observing in dictum that "[tihe culpable mental state relative to the
conduct and result comprised within first-degree sexual assault was, and still is,
knowledge").
The defendant in Chambers, however, was challenging the
sufficiency of jury instructions defining the term "knowingly," and the court
therefore did not need to evaluate whether the mens rea requirement was met on
the facts of that case. 682 P.2d at 1178-79. The court subsequently interpreted
its holding in Chambers as requiring proof of the defendant's "awareness of
engaging in certain prohibited acts which the statute equates to nonconsent."
Dunton v. People, 898 P.2d 571, 573 n.2 (Colo. 1995). Although these rulings
suggest that the prosecution must prove that the defendant knowingly used force,
Dunton held that a trial judge need not instruct the jury that the crime requires
proof that the defendant was aware of the victim's nonconsent, noting that the
statute "prohibits conduct which by its very nature negates the existence of the
victim's consent" and thus "an independent showing of the defendant's awareness
of nonconsent by the victim is unnecessary." Id. at 573. Most recently, in People
v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1996), the court upheld jury instructions
defining the crime of first-degree sexual assault, noting that the jury was
adequately informed that the statute's mens rea requirement of knowledge
"modifie[d] all succeeding conduct elements" of the crime-including, presumably,
the requirement that the defendant "caused [the victim's] submission... through
the actual application of physical force or physical violence." Id. at 272. But that
was the end of the court's mens rea discussion.
The three justices who dissented from the Montana Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Keys, 852 P.2d 621 (Mont. 1993), observed, in the course of
discussing the admissibility of the defendant's prior conviction for indecent
exposure, that "[tihe requirement on the part of the trier of fact [in a rape trial is]
to determine whether or not the defendant knowingly or purposely committed
sexual intercourse without consent." Id. at 628 (Weber, J., dissenting). But there
was no further discussion of mens rea in the opinion.
66. 612 A.2d 923, 925 (N.H. 1992) (quoting State v. Aldrich, 466 A.2d 938, 941
(N.H. 1983)).
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Penal Code's approach to mens rea and "discarded" the
concept of specific and general intent crimes, 67 the court
concluded that requiring proof of knowledge would
"adequately protect [the defendant] from criminal
prosecution for innocent conduct." 68 Although the court did
not provide any further guidance as to which elements of
the crime the knowledge mens rea requirement applied, the
court indicated in a later opinion, State v. Bassett, that the
prosecution must prove that the defendant "knowingly
committed each element of the offenses charged."6 9 Given
that the court made that statement immediately after
noting that Bassett was
charged with "sexual
penetration... by the actual use of physical force or
violence and superior physical strength... and by coercing
[the victim] to submit through threats of violence," the
court presumably meant to extend the knowledge
requirement to the element of force. 7° But the Bassett
opinion revolved around evidentiary issues concerning the
admissibility of the defendant's prior sexual assault
conviction, and not the sufficiency of the evidence of mens
71
rea

67. For a description of the specific/general intent dichotomy, see infra notes

81-96 and accompanying text.
68. Ayer, 612 A.2d at 925.

69. 659 A.2d 891, 896 (N.H. 1995).
70. Id.

71. See id. at 895-98. The West Virginia Supreme Court has also hinted that
it may support a mens rea requirement of knowledge. In two cases involving
allegations that the forcible compulsion required by the state's sexual assault
statute came from someone other than the defendants, the court found sufficient
evidence to support a finding that the defendants were "aware" that the third
party had used "forcible compulsion... which coerced the victim" to have
intercourse with them. State v. Miller, 466 S.E.2d 507, 513 (W. Va. 1995); see

also State v. Hottinger, 461 S.E.2d 462, 469 (W. Va. 1995). In neither of these
cases, however, had the defendant objected to jury instructions defining the term
"forcible compulsion" to include force or intimidation that the defendant knew had
been exerted by a third person, and the court therefore declined to rule on the

propriety of that definition. See Miller, 466 S.E.2d at 513 n.3; Hottinger, 461
S.E.2d at 468 n.4. For a description of two Oregon cases that also use the term
"knowingly," see infra note 79.
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3. Recklessness

Although none of the rape statutes currently in effect
explicitly adopt a mens rea requirement of recklessness,7 2
several courts have seemingly chosen to require proof of
recklessness vis-a-vis the force requirement. In reaching
that result, these courts have relied on provisions in their
state criminal codes modeled on section 2.02(3) of the
Model Penal Code, which requires proof of at least
recklessness in cases where a criminal statute fails to
specify a mens rea requirement.
In State v. Bryant, for example, the Missouri Court of
Appeals reasoned that because the statutory definition of
rape contains no mens rea language, the prosecution must
prove a mental state of at least recklessness.73 Accordingly,
the court upheld instructions advising the jurors to convict
if they found sufficient evidence that the defendant "knew
that sexual intercourse was being accomplished without
the consent of [the victim] by forcible compulsion or
consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that sexual intercourse was being accomplished without
the consent of [the victim] by forcible compulsion." 4
Although this language clearly implies that the
recklessness requirement applies both to lack of consent
and forcible compulsion, the decision goes on to note that
such instructions must be given in cases where consent or
mistakes about consent are at issue, without mentioning
the question of mens rea vis-a-vis force.75 And the court
72. See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
73. 756 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that "[r]ape must be
committed either recklessly or knowingly, negligence is not enough") (citing Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 76-2-102 (1953), a default rule similar to § 2.02(3) of the Model Penal
Code).
74. Id. at 596.
75. See id.; see also State v. Foster, 631 S.W.2d 672, 675-76 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982) (same). There are indications in other Missouri decisions, however, that
the mens rea required in rape cases is something other than recklessness. In
State v. Koonce, 731 S.W.2d 431, 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987), the court held that a
defendant's mistaken belief in the victim's consent must be both honest and
reasonable in order to afford a defense, implying a mens rea of negligence at least
with respect to the element of nonconsent. And in State v. Harris, 620 S.W.2d
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disposed of the case by approving of the jury instructions,
without providing further guidance as to how the mens rea
requirement might be applied either generally or on the
facts of that case. 6

349 (Mo. 1981), the court suggested that rape is a general intent crime, noting
that in cases where the element of force is proven, no intent is necessary "other
than that evidenced by the doing of the acts constituting the offense." Id. at 355
(quoting State v. Tompkins, 277 S.W.2d 587, 591 (Mo. 1955)).
76. Courts in several other jurisdictions have relied on default rules similar to
§ 2.02(3) of the Model Penal Code to justify requiring proof of recklessness when
the rape statute does not include a mens rea term. See State v. Cummins, 347
N.W.2d 571, 572 (N.D. 1984) (citing N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-02-02(2), but then
focusing on the defendant's intoxication defense and the need to define the terms
.purpose" and "knowledge" in the jury instructions, rather than elaborating on
the nature of the mens rea requirement); State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah
1987) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102, but offering no further analysis of the
reach of the mens rea requirement).
Likewise, the Illinois Supreme Court recently ruled that the legislature's
failure to specify a mens rea requirement in the aggravated criminal sexual
assault statute means that "a mental state of intent, knowledge or recklessness
must be implied." People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1114 (Ill. 2000) (citing 720
Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/4-3(b) (1993)). But the court went on to suggest that it
considers sexual assault a general intent crime when it refused to require trial
judges to issue jury instructions on mens rea, observing that the crime's state of
mind requirements "are in the nature of general criminal mental states... which
almost always accompany the acts alleged." Id. For a description of other Illinois
decisions that use similar language and clearly classify sexual assault as a
general intent crime, see infra note 94 and accompanying text. But cf. People v.
Smith, 614 N.E.2d 1326, 1332 (ll. App. Ct.), vacated on other grounds, 620
N.E.2d 417 (Ill. 1993) (noting that "a mental state of intent to commit, or
knowledge of committing, an act of sexual penetration" is "[i]mplicit" in the
definition of aggravated sexual assault, but rejecting any requirement of mens
rea with respect to the aggravating factor that the crime "caused bodily harm,"
and therefore concluding that it was "immaterial that defendant may not have
known he was transmitting, or that he may not have intended to transmit, a
sexual disease to the victim").
For a case relying on a default rule similar to § 2.02(3) of the Model Penal
Code to justify requiring proof of recklessness with respect to the element of
nonconsent, see Reynolds v. State, 664 P.2d 621, 625 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983)
(concluding that "the state must prove that the defendant knowingly engaged in
sexual intercourse and recklessly disregarded his victim's lack of consent,"
without mentioning the issue of mens rea as to force-even though absence of
consent was defined by statute to mean "coerced by the use of force" or the threat
of force).
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4. Negligence

Although, once again, none of the contemporary rape
statutes expressly incorporates a mens rea requirement of
negligence, 7 the Oregon Court of Appeals' decision in State
v. Wasson suggested that negligence may be the
appropriate mens rea for the force requirement. 7 In that
case, the court observed that a defendant must "commit
each of the material elements of the crime [of rape] either
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal
negligence."79 But the court made that comment in the
context of addressing the admissibility of evidence that the
defendant had attempted to rob a store prior to the

attempted rape at issue there, and the court did not
elaborate further on the mens rea issue."0
5. General Intent
Following the traditional common law definition of the
crime, and given the absence of mens rea language in most

rape statutes,8 ' a substantial number of courts have held
that rape is a general intent crime, as opposed to a specific

77. See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text,
78. 607 P.2d 792 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
79. Id. at 794 n.5 (citing Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 163.375, 161.115(2)). But cf.State v.
Bunyea, 606 P.2d 685, 687 n.6 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (observing-in the context of
addressing a defense of mistaken consent-that the indictment in that case
alleged that the defendant "did unlawfully and knowingly, by forcible compulsion,
engage in sexual intercourse," and defining "knowingly" to require that "the
defendant was aware that he was using force to compel the victim to submit"); see
also State v. Francis, 588 P.2d 611, 612 n.1, 614 (Or. 1978) (likewise noting-in
the context of upholding the trial judge's refusal to give the defendant's requested
instruction on "intent"-that the indictment alleged that the defendant
"unlawfully and knowingly, by forcible compulsion, engage[d) in sexual
intercourse, '" and therefore "an instruction worded in terms of'intent' should not
be given in a prosecution for a crime where the indictment alleges 'knowledge'").
80. Cf. Reynolds v. State, 664 P.2d 621, 630 n.3 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (noting
that one of the aggravating factors about the crime that the trial judge found
relevant in sentencing the defendant was that he "should have known that [a
handgun left in clear view near the bed] would intimidate" the victim even though
the judge "did not find that Reynolds intentionally relied on the gun to intimidate
her") (emphasis added).
81. See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
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intent crime.82 But these courts have not all used the term
"general intent" in the same way, thus confirming the
widespread criticism of the general/specific intent
dichotomy as confusing and vague.8 Some courts seem to
define general intent crimes as those requiring proof of
knowledge rather than purpose,8 therefore effectively
aligning those jurisdictions with those that have adopted a
knowledge mens rea for rape cases. By contrast, another
court has used the term "general intent" to mean that "no
knowledge is required for the element of force or
coercion." ' And at least one court has defined general
intent crimes as those for which "the only intent required is
6
one of conscious wrongdoing."

Adding to the confusion, some courts have
simultaneously incorporated a number of different notions
into the concept of "general intent" when discussing the
82. See, e.g., Stokes v. State, 648 So. 2d 1179, 1181 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994)

(observing that "[r]ape in the first degree does not require proof of specific
intent"); State v. Crawford, 672 So. 2d 197, 210 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that
.specific intent is not an essential element of aggravated rape"). See generally
Dressler, supra note 16, § 33.05, at 545.
83. See, e.g., People v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 377 (Cal. 1969) (noting that
"isipecific and general intent have been notoriously difficult terms to define and
apply"); Dressier, supra note 16, § 10.06, at 118-19 (calling the terms "the bane of
criminal law students and lawyers," in part because "there is no universally
accepted meaning to the terms"); Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Criminal Law and Its Processes: Cases and Materials 218 (6th ed. 1995)
(observing that the terms "have been the source of endless confusion in the
courts" and "are often used inconsistently").
84. See State v. Ayer, 612 A-2d 923,925 (N.H. 1992).
85. People v. Brown, 495 N.W.2d 812, 813 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam).
But cf. People v. Corbiere, 559 N.W.2d 666, 669 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (citing
Brown for the proposition that a general intent crime is "proved by showing that
the defendant committed a proscribed sexual act").
86. State v. Duncan, 830 P.2d 554, 562 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990), affd on other
grounds, 805 P.2d 621 (N.M. 1991) (holding that criminal sexual penetration in
the second degree, which requires proof of force or coercion that causes physical
injury, is not a specific intent crime); see also State v. Campos, 921 P.2d 1266,
1277 (N.M. 1996) (defining a general intent crime as one that involves "conscious
wrongdoing or the purposeful doing of an act that the law declares to be a crime")
(emphasis added). But cf. People v. Osband, 919 P.2d 640, 681 (Cal. 1996) (noting
that because rape is a general intent crime, the defendant need not have intended
to violate the law, and explaining that, "[w]hen a person intentionally does that
which the law declares to be a crime, he is acting with general criminal intent,
even though he may not know that his act or conduct is unlawful").
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mens rea required for rape. In State v. Cantrell, for
example, the Kansas Supreme Court approved language
from a prior dissent which indicated that because "'specific
intent is not a genuine issue in a rape case'" and the
prosecution must establish that the victim 'was overcome
by force and subjected to sexual intercourse without
consent," "[ilt is her intent and state of mind which is of
supreme importance. ' " " But the court also suggested that

the defendant's state of mind was significant when it
observed that the defendant

must have "'voluntarily

committed the act of forcible sexual intercourse'

8

and that

his conduct must have been "intentional," that is, "'willful
and purposeful and not accidental." 9 Despite this
language, the court went on to reject the defendant's
contention that his conviction could not stand unless he
was "aware of the victim's resistance and intended to
engage in intercourse despite that resistance," noting that
for crimes that make no "'express reference to intent,"' it is
enough "'simply to allege the commission of the act.., and
the intent will be presumed."'' 9
87. 673 P.2d 1147, 1153 (Kan. 1983) (quoting State v. Gonzales, 535 P.2d 988,
990 (Kan. 1975) (Prager, J., dissenting)).
88. Id. (quoting Gonzales, 535 P.2d at 990 (Prager, J., dissenting)).
89. Id. at 1152 (quoting the jury instructions); see also State v. Esher, 922
P.2d 1123, 1126 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (observing that, even for general intent
crimes, the state's criminal statutes make "a criminal intent.., an essential
element," requiring "[piroof of intentional conduct ...
, unless the statute defining
the crime expressly provides that the prohibited act is criminal if done in a
reckless manner," and distinguishing specific intent crimes as those that require
in addition -a further particular intent which must accompany the prohibited
acts') (quoting State v. Sterling, 680 P.2d 301, 303 (Kan. 1984)).
90. Cantrell, 673 P.2d at 1155, 1154 (quoting State v. Cruitt, 436 P.2d 870,
873 (Kan. 1968)).
Subsequent decisions by the Kansas Supreme Court have not alleviated
the confusion. On the one hand, the court has persisted in rejecting any
requirement that the prosecution prove that a rape defendant "intended to have
nonconsensual intercourse," noting that the statute only requires proof of "sexual
intercourse without the victim's consent when the victim was overcome by force or
fear," and therefore "[wihether [he] thought his victim consented or was not
fearful is irrelevant if the State proved that she did not consent and was overcome
by fear." State v. Plunkett, 934 P.2d 113, 118 (Kan. 1997). On the other hand,
the court has suggested that the prosecution must demonstrate that the
defendant's "sexual conduct was willful and purposeful and, thus, intentional."
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Despite these variations in the courts' use of the term
"general intent," most courts that consider rape a general
intent crime pick up on the portion of the court's opinion in
Cantrell that defines general intent crimes as those
requiring "only a general intent to perform the physical
acts that constitute [the] crime," and not "a specific
intention to have intercourse without the consent of the
victim."9 1 Thus, as a general intent crime, rape does not
require proof of "'a special mental element.., beyond any
Id.
The Washington Court of Appeals has likewise used differing notions of
the concept of general intent. In State v. Walden, 841 P.2d 81, 83 (Wash. Ct. App.
1992), the court observed that the crime of second-degree rape-defined as sexual
intercourse by forcible compulsion--'includes no element of intent" and therefore
allows convictions "without proof of the existence of any mental state." But the
court also noted that "our courts have consistently rejected the argument that
intent or knowledge is an implied element of the crime of rape," thereby perhaps
leaving open the possibility of a recklessness or negligence mens rea requirement.
Id. at 83-84; see also State v. Brown, 899 P.2d 34, 35 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995)
(same). At another point, however, the Walden opinion-like the Kansas
Supreme Court's opinion in Cantrell-suggested that the victim's state of mind is
the key, explaining that "the only mental state explicit in the definition of forcible
compulsion is the victim's 'fear of death or physical injury.'" 841 P.2d at 84 n.2
(quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.010(6)). Nevertheless, the court indicated that
the defendant's state of mind continues to be relevant when it reasoned that "the
Legislature criminalized particular conduct-the use of physical force or the
threat of physical harm-as a means of inducing nonconsensual intercourse" and
"s]ince one cannot accidentally or innocently induce another person to engage in
sexual intercourse by means of force or threat, there is no need to imply specific
intent as an element of the crime in order to prevent nonculpable conduct from
being criminal." Id. at 84. "Requiring proof that the actor intended to forcibly
compel intercourse," the Walden court feared, "would lead to the troubling result
that a perpetrator could be exonerated by arguing that he did not intend to
overcome resistance or did not intend his conduct as an express or implied
threat." Id.; see also State v. Brown, 899 P.2d 34, 36 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995)
(same). Exacerbating the confusion, the Washington Court of Appeals has on
other occasions suggested that the prosecution must demonstrate the defendant's
intent to exert force. See State v. Weisberg, 829 P.2d 252, 255 (Wash. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that in cases where the evidence of forcible compulsion involves
merely an implied threat, "a finding of forcible compulsion cannot be based solely
on the victim's subjective reaction to particular conduct," but also requires
evidence that the defendant "in some way communicated his intention to inflict
physical injury in order to coerce compliance") (emphasis added); State v.
McKnight, 774 P.2d 532, 535 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (ruling that proof of forcible
compulsion requires evidence that "the force exerted was directed at overcoming
the victim's resistance") (emphasis added).
91. State v. Smith, 554 A.2d 713, 715-16 (Conn. 1989).
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mental state required with respect to the actus reus of the
2
crime. M9

But the element of force is part of the actus reus-one
of the "physical acts that constitute the crime"--and
therefore some mens rea requirement should presumably
attach to the force element in these jurisdictions.
According to a number of these courts, however, the mens
rea is inextricably tied to the actus reus, such that proof of
force necessarily implies proof of the requisite mens rea.
As the Massachusetts Appeals Court put it:
[A] finding by the jury based upon the behavior of the
defendant and the victim in a rape case that the sexual
encounter was against the will, or without the consent of,
the victim of necessity implies a finding of general intent
without a separate instruction on that issue. So formulated,
the crime is "based on the premise that one person cannot
accidentally or innocently induce another person to engage
in sexual intercourse by means of [force or] a threat."93
Similarly, in the words of the Illinois Appellate Court,
"'[i]t is obvious that the commission of the general intent
crime[] of criminal sexual assault.., necessarily implies an
intent or knowledge.' ' 4 Implicitly, then, these courts seem
92. State v. Lopez, 892 P.2d 898, 900-01 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995) (holding that
rape is not a specific intent crime) (quoting 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W.
Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 3.5(e), at 315 (1986)); see also People v.
Osband, 919 P.2d 640, 681 (Cal. 1996) (observing that rape is a general intent
crime and therefore "performing a proscribed act was enough to violate the law");
State v. Lamphere, 348 N.W.2d 212, 217 (Iowa 1984); Commonwealth v. Grant,
464 N.E.2d 33, 36-35 (Mass. 1984); State v. Hart, 477 N.W.2d 732, 736 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1991) (reasoning that the crime of first-degree criminal sexual conduct is a
general intent crime because the statute contains no "intent requirement," and
thus "[tlhe intent required... is the intent to do the act that constitutes the
crime"); Roberson v. State, 501 So. 2d 398, 401 (Miss. 1987); State v. Koperski,
578 N.W.2d 837, 847 (Neb. 1998) (explaining that "[als a general intent crime,
criminal intent is inferred from the commission of the acts constituting the
elements of the crime"); State v. Daughtry, 459 S.E.2d 747, 761 (N.C. 1995); Boyd
v. State, 572 P.2d 276, 279 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977); Bryan v. State, 745 P.2d 905,
909 (Wyo. 1987).
93. Commonwealth v. Lefkowitz, 481 N.E.2d 227, 231 n.12 (Mass. App. Ct.
1985) (quoting State v. Saucier, 421 A.2d 57, 59 (Me. 1980)).
94. People v. Bock, 611 N.E.2d 1173, 1187 (IMI.App. Ct. 1993) (quoting People
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to be saying that the crime of rape involves a purposeful or
knowing use of force. 5 At the same time, however, they
balk at any suggestion that the prosecution must establish
that mens rea, refusing to demand proof that a rape
defendant "had sexual intercourse with the intent that it be
by force or threat of bodily injury and against the victim's

will. "9
However these various courts define the term "general
intent," their opinions do not shed any more light on the
way in which a mens rea requirement might apply to the
element of force than the other decisions described in the
prior sections. These cases tend to involve questions about
the defendant's right to a jury instruction on intoxication or
some other defense 97 or on a lesser-included offense, 98 the
wording of the jury instructions on mens rea, 9 the
v. Talley, 531 N.E.2d 1139, 1141 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)) (noting also that the
aggravated criminal sexual assault statute "does not specify a mental state" and
therefbre creates a general intent crime, and, "as such, the requisite mental state
ordinarily follows the prohibited conduct").
95. See People v. Osband, 919 P.2d 640, 681 (Cal. 1996) (defining rape as a
general intent crime, and noting that "[wihen a person intentionally does that
which the law declares to be a crime, he is acting with general criminal intent,
even though he may not know that his act or conduct is unlawful") (emphasis
added); The Queen v. Bernard [1988] 2 S.C.R. 833, 883 (Wilson, J.) (observing
that sexual assault is a general intent crime, requiring no "intent or purpose
beyond the intentional application of force") (emphasis added).
96. Commonwealth v. Grant, 464 N.E.2d 33, 35 (Mass. 1984).
97. See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 892 P.2d 898, 900-01 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995)
(intoxication); State v. Hart, 477 N.W.2d 732, 736 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)
(intoxication); State v. Campos, 921 P.2d 1266, 1274-79 (N.M. 1996)
(intoxication); State v. Daughtry, 459 S.E.2d 747, 761 (N.C. 1995) (diminished
capacity); Boyd v. State, 572 P.2d 276, 278-79 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977)
(intoxication); The Queen v. Bernard [1988] 2 S.C.R. 833 (intoxication).
98. See, e.g., People v. Corbiere, 559 N.W.2d 666, 668-69 (Mich. Ct. App.
1996); State v. Walden, 841 P.2d 81, 82-84 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
99. See, e.g., People v. Osband, 919 P.2d 640, 681 (Cal. 1996); People v. Bock,
611 N.E,2d 1173, 1186-88 (111. App. Ct. 1993); State v. Lamphere, 348 N.W.2d
212, 217 (Iowa 1984); State v. Plunkett, 934 P.2d 113, 117-19 (Kan. 1997); State
v. Cantrell, 673 P.2d 1147, 1152-54 (Kan. 1983); Commonwealth v. Grant, 464
N.E.2d 33, 36-37 (Mass. 1984); Commonwealth v. Lefkowitz, 481 N.E.2d 227, 22932 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985); People v. Brown, 495 N.W.2d 812, 813 (Mich. Ct. App.
1992); State v. Hart, 477 N.W.2d 732, 735-36 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Koperski, 578 N.W.2d 837, 847 (Neb. 1998); State v. Brown, 899 P.2d 34, 35
(Wash. Ct. App. 1995). Cf. Bryan v. State, 745 P.2d 905, 908-09 (Wyo. 1987)
(rejecting defendant's argument that his guilty plea should be set aside because
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admissibility of the defendant's prior crimes,10 or the
sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence of force 1 or mens
rea vis-a-vis nonconsent. 10 2 And they are resolved on that
basis, without further elucidation of the mens rea
requirement as it applies to force.
6. Strict Liability
Finally, some courts seem to read the legislature's
failure to include mens rea language in their rape statutes
to imply that no state of mind requirement attaches to the
element of force, thereby making force a matter of strict
liability. As a practical matter, however, it is difficult to
distinguish some of these opinions from those described in
the prior section that treat rape as a general intent crime.
In State v. Neumann, for example, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals held that "no particular intent is
required" to support a conviction for sexual intercourse
"without consent, by use or threat of force or violence." °3
After noting the absence of any mens rea requirement in
the statute and examining its legislative history, the court
concluded that "the legislature intentionally
omitted any
10 4
intent requirement" from the crime.

Likewise, in State v. Reed, the Maine Supreme Court
noted that the crime of forcible rape was "defined without
reference to the actor's state of mind," concluding that
"[t]he legislature... clearly indicated that rape compelled
by force or threat requires no culpable state of mind."'' °
But the court went on to remark that "one person cannot
accidentally or innocently compel another to submit to

the trial judge failed to inform him that sexual assault was a specific intent
crime).
100. See, e.g., State v. Crawford, 672 So. 2d 197, 209-11 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
101. See, e.g., Stokes v. State, 648 So. 2d 1179, 1181-82 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994).
102. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 554 A.2d 713, 715-18 (Conn. 1989).
103. 508 N.W.2d 54, 62 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
104. Id. at 62-63 (refusing to allow the defendant to raise an intoxication
defense).
105. 479 A.2d 1291, 1296 (Me. 1984).
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sexual intercourse," °6 thereby suggesting that its view is
more in line with the courts that consider rape a general
intent crime.0 7 In any event, the mens rea issue was not
significant to the outcome of the case, as the opinion
focused on the trial judge's refusal to instruct the jury that
it must find that the defendant "intentionally or knowingly
used physical force against the complainant, knowing that
she did not consent," and the court disposed of the case by
upholding the jury instructions without inquiring into the
nature of the defendant's mens rea vis-a-vis force. 08
Finally, in Tobias v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court
indicated not only that the defendant's mens rea with
respect to force is not a significant factor in a rape
prosecution, but also that the sole focus is on the victim's
perception of the situation. 10 9 Despite the fact that the
Indiana rape statute requires proof that a defendant
"knowingly or intentionally has sexual intercourse with a
member of the opposite sex when: (1) the other person is
compelled by force or imminent threat of force," 10 the court
explained:
[Ilt is the victim's perspective, not the assailant's, from
which the presence or absence of forceful compulsion is to be
determined. This is a subjective test that looks to the
victim's perception of the circumstances surrounding the
incident in question. The issue is thus whether the victim
perceived the aggressor's force or imminent threat of force

106. Id. But cf. State v. Pierce, 438 A.2d 247, 251-52 (Me. 1981) (using similar
language when interpreting a prior version of the statute, in support of the
conclusion that the prosecution need not prove a "specific intent to induce
submission by means of a threat") (emphasis added).
107. See supra note 93 and accompanying text; see also Coler v. State, 418 So.
2d 238, 239 (Fla. 1982) (noting that "[s]tate of mind is not a material fact in a
sexual battery charge, nor is intent an issue," but citing in support Askew v.
State, 118 So. 2d 219, 222 (Fla. 1960), which treated sexual battery as a general
intent crime and held that "no specific intent is requisite other than that
evidenced by the doing of the acts constituting the offense").
108. Reed, 479 A.2d at 1295.
109. 666 N.E.2d 68 (Ind. 1996).
110. Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-4-1 (West Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
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as compelling her compliance."'

But the court thought that the case involved an
unquestionable use of force and therefore quickly disposed
of the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence of force, without adverting further to the mens rea
requirement."

2

Although some courts have therefore suggested that
the element of force is a matter of strict liability, at times
their reasoning is indistinguishable from that found in
cases which treat rape as a general intent crime.
Moreover, the references to mens rea in these opinions tend
to be brief and offhand and to have no real bearing on the
outcome of the case. These decisions are no different,
therefore, from those described above in the previous
sections, which while acknowledging the question of mens
rea and force, discuss it only in passing. The one case that
addresses the subject at any level of detail is described in
the following section.
C. People v. Evans
In People v. Evans, perhaps the most well-known of
the judicial opinions to discuss questions of mens rea as
applied to the element of force, the trial court suggested
that rape convictions require proof that the defendant
intended to use force."1 The defendant in Evans pretended

111. Tobias, 666 N.E.2d at 72. But cf. People v. Witte, 449 N.E.2d 966, 971 n.2
(Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (making a similar observation but then holding that rape is a
general intent crime, rather than a matter of strict liability).
112. See Tobias, 666 N.E.2d at 72 (reasoning that the victim was a sixteenyear-old girl, who was "clandestinely participating in an escapade of overnight
camping, drinking, and sex with her boyfriend after deceiving her parents as to
her whereabouts [and] was suddenly caught.., by two adult men-one of whom
was the defendant, age 58-representing and asserting the enforcement authority
of the campground," who took her to a "remote, locked office" and "performed

sexual intercourse on her... after demanding her compliance; physically forcing
himself upon her, and ignoring her lack of consent, verbal resistance, and
requests for him to stop").
113. 379 N.Y.S.2d 912 (Sup. Ct. 1975), affd mem., 390 N.Y.S.2d 768 (App. Div.
1976).
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to be a psychologist interested in interviewing the victim
for a magazine article. In addition to engaging in a variety
of deceptive behaviors, he "took steps to cause doubt and
fear to arise in [the victim's] mind" by saying: "Look where
you are. You are in the apartment of a strange man. How
do you know that I am really who I say I am? How do you
know that I am really a psychologist?... I could kill you. I
could rape you. I could hurt you physically." 114 In finding
insufficient evidence of the "forcible compulsion" required
by New York's rape statute, the court observed that the
defendant's comment that he "could" kill or rape the victim
was
"susceptible
to
two
possible
and
diverse
interpretations":
The first would be in essence that-you had better do what I
say, for you are helpless and I have the power to use
ultimate force should you resist. That clearly would be a
threat which would induce fear and overcome resistance.
The second possible meaning of those words is, in effect,
that-you are a foolish girl. You are in the apartment of a
strange man. You put yourself in the hands of a stranger,
and you are vulnerable and defenseless. The possibility
would exist of physical harm to you were you being
confronted by someone other than the person who uttered
this statement. 1 5
Although the court acknowledged that it was "entirely
possible" the victim interpreted the defendant's words as a
threat, and that that interpretation was a reasonable one,
the court concluded that "the controlling state of mind
must be that of the speaker":
[Tihis being a criminal trial, it is basic that the criminal
intent of the defendant must be shown beyond a reasonable
doubt. It is his intent when he acts, his intent when he
speaks, which must therefore be controlling. And so, if he
utters words which are taken as a threat by the person who
hears them, but are not intended as a threat by the person
114. Id. at 917.
115. Id. at 920.

786

BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:755

who utters them, there would be no basis for finding the
necessary
criminal intent to establish culpability under the
16
law.

1

Picking up on the clear implication of the phrase
italicized above, the New York Court of Appeals
subsequently held in People v. Williams that "intent is
implicitly an element" of the crime of rape even though the
rape statute is "silent on the subject."1"7 But the court went
on to align itself with those jurisdictions that treat rape as
a general intent crime. "The intent required," the court
continued, "is the intent to perform the prohibited act-i.e.,
the intent to forcibly compel another to engage in
intercourse" 5m-language reminiscent of that appearing in
some of the cases adopting the view that rape is a general
intent crime." 9
Moreover, the court rejected the
defendants' claim that the jury should have been instructed
that intent is an element of the crime and that a mistaken
belief in consent could negate the requisite mens rea.
Noting that the trial judge had instructed the jury that the
crime required proof of lack of consent caused by forcible
compulsion, the court explained that "it is unnecessary to
forcibly compel another to engage in sexual acts unless that
person is an unwilling participant."12 0 The court therefore
concluded that the jury's finding that the defendants used
physical compulsion to coerce the victim "necessarily"
constituted a finding that they "believed the victim did not
consent to the sexual activity."'' After Williams, therefore,
New York seems to be a jurisdiction that considers rape a
116. Id. at 920-21 (emphasis added); see also Chavez v. State, 601 P.2d 166,
172 (Wyo. 1979) (observing that "[i]t is not possible to structure the criminal
intent of the defendant out of the subjective attitudes of the alleged victim";
rather, the "general intent ... must exist in the mind of the perpetrator").
117. 614 N.E.2d 730, 736 (N.Y. 1993).
118. Id.
119. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
120. Williams, 614 N.E.2d at 736.
121. Id. at 737; see also People v. Fenten, 563 N.Y.S.2d 522, 523 (App. Div.
1990) (observing, without citing Evans, that "[wihile intent is clearly an element
of rape in the first degree, we find that the element of intent is implicit in the
element of forcible compulsion, on which the jury was properly instructed").
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general intent crime, and the arena of debate has shifted
from the question of mens rea vis-a-vis force addressed in
Evans to the question of mens rea vis-a-vis consent. Thus,
Evans turns out to be only a short-lived exception to the
courts' general tendency to completely ignore the question
of mens rea as it applies to the force requirement or, at
best, to mention the issue in passing before resolving the
case on other grounds. The implications of this pattern for
the criminal law's insistence on requiring proof of both
force and lack of consent in order to support a rape
conviction are discussed in the following section.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS
The relative lack of attention given to the question of
mens rea and force-and its insignificance to the outcome
of the case in the rare opinion where it has been
discussed-is not due to inattentiveness on the part of
legislators, sloppy reasoning on the part of judges, or
unimaginative lawyering on the part of defense counsel.
Rather, the reason the issue has attracted so little
attention is that the force and nonconsent elements of rape
overlap with one another, making a mens rea requirement
with respect to force redundant where the prosecution can
prove lack of consent and its accompanying mens rea.
To be sure, it would seem pedestrian for a court to
address separately the issue of mens rea in a case involving
an obvious show of force-force that even "a schoolboy
might recognize."122 In such circumstances, the defendant's
use of force itself clearly demonstrates that he was acting
with a culpable state of mind. Thus, for example, a
defendant who beats his victim into submission or
expressly threatens her with a weapon is obviously using
force knowingly, if not purposefully. 1 23 Faced with those
facts, it makes sense for a court to reason that the
122. Estrich, supra note 4, at 66.
123. See id. at 99-100 (observing that, if proof of actual force is required to
support a rape conviction, "the question of intent [does] not arise, since the use of
such force [is] unlikely to be accidental").
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defendant could not be "accidentally or innocently" using
force, and therefore that proof of the actus reus-the
use of
12 4
force-"necessarily implies an intent or knowledge."
At least as a theoretical matter, however, we can
envision cases where the nature of the defendant's state of
mind concerning force would be a debatable issue. One
obvious example is Evans, where the trial court found the
meaning of the defendant's comments about killing and
raping the victim to be ambiguous. In addition, the
defendant's mens rea vis-a-vis the force requirement could
have been a controversial question in some of the other
cases described above in Part II. Consider a case where the
defendant has a weapon or a large dog in the room at the
time in question, but it is unclear whether the defendant is
purposefully using it to create fear or is oblivious of its
presence and likely impact on the victim.

12

The facts of

Rusk provide another illustration. Was the defendant's act
of "lightly" choking the victim intended to be "actual force"
(as the majority in the Court of Appeals concluded 26 ) or a
"heavy caress" (as the Court of Special Appeals found12)?
When the defendant in State v. Weisberg "told" the victim
to "lie down on his bed," and then, when she said she did
not want to, responded, "go ahead and lay on the bed
124. For a description of opinions adopting this line of reasoning, see supra
notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
125. For illustrations of such cases, see Reynolds v. State, 664 P.2d 621, 622,
630 n.3 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (the defendant carried the victim into his bedroom,
where the victim saw a handgun on a chair; the trial judge found that the
defendant "should have known that it would intimidate" the victim, even though
he "never touched or even mentioned the handgun" and did not "intentionally
rel[y] on the gun to intimidate her"); State v. Foster, 631 S.W.2d 672, 673, 674
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (the defendant had mentioned to the victim earlier that day
that his two Doberman pinschers would "attack at his command," and the court
concluded that she was "under the constant threat that defendant would
command the dogs to attack her").
126. State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720, 728 (Md. 1981).
127. Rusk v. State, 406 A.2d 624, 628 (Md. Ct. Spec. App 1979), rev'd, 424 A.2d
720 (Md. 1981); see also Estrich, supra note 4, at 64 (observing that either the
defendant or the victim in Rusk could have been lying or, alternatively, "neither
was lying [and] 'light choking' to her was nothing more than a 'heavy caress' to
him"); Dressier, supra note 10, at 420 (commenting that "one person's light choke
is another person's inartful caress").
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anyway," did he speak in a menacing or a cajoling tone of
voice? 2
In cases involving more than one defendant,
where one of them made threats or exerted force, it may
not be clear whether the others were aware of and took
advantage of that show of force. 29 Similarly, where the
victim fears the defendant because of a past history of
abuse, it may be open to question whether the defendant is
trying to capitalize on her fear or completely unfamiliar
with her history."10
Although the defendant's state of mind regarding force
may be debatable in each of these instances, Evans is the
only one of the cases on which these hypotheticals are
based that actually turned on the court's analysis of that
issue. Had the question of mens rea vis-a-vis force been
raised in any of these other settings, the outcome of the
case would have depended on the particular mens rea

128. 829 P.2d 252, 254 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (finding insufficient evidence of
the "forcible compulsion" required to support a rape conviction because there was
"absolutely no evidence indicating either that Weisberg suggested or threatened
harm to [the victim] if she did not comply or that he used any physical force to
obtain compliance").
129. For illustrations of such cases, see People v. Brown, 495 N.W.2d 812, 813
(Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (the defendant found the victim sitting alone in a bedroom,
naked and crying, and claimed that he did not know she had been kidnapped and
raped by other men in the house); State v. Miller, 466 S.E.2d 507, 510 (W. Va.
1995) (the defendant's brother, who was also the stepfather of the thirteen-yearold victim, told the defendant that the victim "wanted to do it," but there was no
discussion between the defendant and the victim; the court found sufficient
evidence that the victim feared that her stepfather would beat her if she refused
and that the defendant was aware of the forcible compulsion exercised by his
brother, despite the defendant's allegation that he and his brother "did not speak
and had a poor relationship"); Chavez v. State, 601 P.2d 166, 168 (Wyo. 1979) (the
defendant's companion, who was obviously drunk, "bragged about his gun" to the
victim and said "he enjoyed shooting it," but it was not clear that the defendant
was present during this conversation).
130. For illustrations of such cases, see State v. Zamudio, 645 P.2d 593, 594-95
(Or. Ct. App. 1982) (the defendant's wife told the victim a month earlier that the
defendant had beaten and injured her; in addition, the victim had herself been
beaten by her husband, and she told the defendant that she was "real nervous
about men"); Marcia Baron, "I Thought She Consented," 11 Phil. Issues
(forthcoming 2001) (hypothesizing a situation where a "survivor of chronic sexual
abuse... is so accustomed to refusal being pointless (and more likely dangerous,
as well), so accustomed to accommodating the men who abused her, that she is
unable to express refusal... if the initiator is at all pushy").
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requirement adopted in that jurisdiction and the jury's
assessment of whether that requirement had been met.
Some jurors might reasonably have thought, for example,
that the defendant purposefully used certain words or
facial expressions, or purposefully relied on the presence of
a weapon or dog, to create fear in the victim's mind, and
thus as an implicit threat. Others might conclude only that
he knew-or should have known-that those factors were
likely to have such an effect on the victim. Still others
might believe that he lacked any culpable mens rea
whatsoever, even though the victim thought he was using
or threatening force.
If the applicable state of mind requirement was
negligence-so that the issue became whether a reasonable
person would have thought the defendant was using
force-the question would arise as to whose perspective
controls. Given "[t]he reality of our existence... that it
takes less force to overcome most women than most men,"
"[t]he question of whose definition of 'force' should apply, of
whose understanding should govern, is critical." 131

That

issue is particularly critical today given the "gender
gap 132--perhaps more accurately termed the "gender
chasm"-in our "perceptions of when sex [is] forced." 13 As
one commentator explained:
Because both men and women are socialized to accept
coercive sexuality as the norm in sexual behavior, men often
see extreme forms of this aggressive behavior as seduction,
rather than rape. A great many incidents women consider
rape are, in effect, considered "normal" by both male
perpetrators and the male-dominated legal system....
Thus, what is "normal" according to male social norms and
"reasonable" according to male communication patterns and
131. Estrich, supra note 4, at 22, 60.
132. Robin D. Weiner, Note, Shifting the Communication Burden: A
Meaningful Consent Standard in Rape, 6 Harv. Women's L.J. 143, 147 (1983).
133. Robert T. Michael et al., Sex in America: A Definitive Survey 221, 223, 227
(1994) (describing survey results indicating that twenty-two percent of women
reported having been "forced to do something sexually at some time," whereas
only three percent of men admitted ever "having forced a woman").
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expectations does not accord with what women believe to be
reasonable....
. A reasonable woman... may perceive certain
behavior as indicating that the man plans to have sex with
her whether she consents or not, although the man may not
have meant to communicate such an intent.
A woman may believe she has communicated her
unwillingness to have sex-and other women would agree,
thus making it a "reasonable" female expression. Her male
partner might still believe she is willing-and other men
would agree with his interpretation, thus making it a
"reasonable" male interpretation. The woman, who believes
she has conveyed her lack of consent, may interpret the
man's persistence as an indication that he does not care if
she objects and plans to have sex despite her lack of
consent."3
Although the Evans court thought that the man's state
of mind ought to control in cases where the gender gap is at
work-because in "a criminal trial, it is basic that the
criminal intent of the defendant must be shown beyond a
reasonable doubt," and therefore "[iut is his intent when he
acts, his intent when he speaks, which must.., be
controlling"' 3 5-that view is not without its critics. For
example, Catharine MacKinnon has pointed out that it is
134. Weiner, supra note 132, at 147-49; see also Schulhofer, supra note 3, at
256 (observing that "many men see nothing improper about continuing to press
forward with physical advances in spite of a date's passivity or even direct signs
of her unwillingness," and "even if she is emphatic, her effort to communicate
may not be sufficient to bridge the gender gap"); Henderson, supra note 4, at 159
(noting that "[mien just don't see the violence"); McGregor, supra note 8, at 189
(commenting that "notions of force, violence, and threat are elastic-in other
words, what women view as threatening or forceful, men may not").
135. 379 N.Y.S.2d 912, 921 (Sup. Ct. 1975), affd mem., 490 N.Y.S.2d 768 (App.
Div. 1976); see also Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 257 (observing that "[e]mphasis
on the defendant's perspective is the traditional starting point in a criminal case,
because the question to be decided is not just whether a victim has been hurt but
whether the defendant deserves to suffer criminal punishment for causing the
injury").
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problematic to define the crime of rape "from the male
point of view" given that rape is "only an injury from the
women's point of view": "the injury of rape lies in the
meaning of the act to its victim, but the standard for its
criminality lies in the meaning of the act to the
assailant."36 Likewise, another commentator has criticized
the criminal law's focus on the man's point of view as "a
distortion of the reality of rape." 1
However one comes out on the question of whose
perspective ought to control, the fact is that this subject
has not received much attention from the courts because
the defendant's mens rea with respect to force has not been
an issue of any practical significance-even in the type of
cases described above where, as an abstract matter, it
might have been debatable. Instead of analyzing whether
the defendant purposely or knowingly used force, or should
have known that he was using force, the courts have
disposed of such cases by evaluating the sufficiency of the
evidence offered to prove either the actus reus of force or
the defendant's mens rea vis-a-vis nonconsent.
The
absence of any real discussion of mens rea with respect to
force points up the redundancy of the force requirement,
once absence of consent has been proven.
Although numerous courts have accepted the notion
that proof of force demonstrates lack of consent, 3 " a few
notable court opinions have refused to accept the converse
proposition and therefore have reversed rape convictions
after concluding that the element of nonconsent was
136. MacKinnon, supra note 3, at 180.
137. Patricia Hughes, From a Woman's Point of View, 42 U. New Brunswick
L.J. 341, 343 (1993).
138. See, e.g., Ex parte Gordon, 706 So. 2d 1160, 1163 (Ala. 1997) (observing
that "[florcible compulsion is conclusive presumptive evidence of lack of consent")
(emphasis deleted); State v. Rivera, 638 A.2d 34, 35 (Conn. 1994) (commenting
that '[where use of force or a threat of force is proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
lack of consent is implicit... [blecause the use of force or a threat of force is
essentially the converse of consent'") (quoting the appellate court's opinion);
People v. Jansson, 323 N.W.2d 508, 513 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that "to
prove force or coercion... is to establish that the victim did not consent"); see also
McGregor, supra note 8, at 184 ("it would seem logical to assume that if force is
present it is because consent is absent").
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proven, but not the element of force. One such case was
State v. Alston, where the North Carolina Supreme Court
found sufficient evidence that the victim had "expressly
and unequivocally" communicated her lack of consent, but
"no substantial evidence of either actual or constructive
force." 13 9 Another was Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, where
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court likewise did not question
the evidence of nonconsent-in the court's words, the
victim "stated 'no' throughout the encounter" with the
defendant-but found insufficient evidence of the "forcible
compulsion" required by the state's rape statute.
But
there are few such decisions, and they have proven quite
controversial.

139. 312 S.E.2d 470, 475, 476 (N.C. 1984). The court reached this conclusion
despite evidence that the defendant had previously battered the victim and,
shortly before intercourse, had "threatened to 'fix' her face." Id. at 472. These
facts prompted one commentator to observe that the Alston court defined the
concept of force "strictly in schoolboy terms," using "the most traditional male
notion of a fight." Estrich, supra note 4, at 62. The defendant "did not beat his
victim-at least not with his fists"--because "hie didn't have to," given that
"[sihe had been beaten, physically and emotionally, long before." Id.; see also
Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 76 (criticizing the Alston court's approach as
.artificial because it focuses narrowly, in snapshot fashion, on specific comments
and gestures at the time of a rape incident.., without considering the broader
context"). The North Carolina Supreme Court itself subsequently described
Alston as "unique" and "peculiar," State v. Brown, 420 S.E.2d 147, 151, 150 (N.C.
1992), leading another commentator to conclude that the court "has virtually
repudiated its decision in Alston." Dressler, supra note 10, at 421.
140. 641 A.2d 1161, 1164 (Pa. 1994) (reversing the defendant's rape conviction,
though affirming his conviction on the lesser charge of indecent assault, defined
as "indecent contact... without ... consent"). The court explained that, although
the evidence showed that the defendant "pushed [the victim] onto the bed," she
described the "push" as "kind of in the middle" between "a romantic kind of thing"
and "a fast shove." Id. at 1163, 1164. The court likewise dismissed the fact that
the defendant locked the door to his dorm room by noting that "the door could be
unlocked easily from the inside, ... she was aware of this fact, but.., she never
attempted to go to the door or unlock it." Id. at 1164. And the court thus
concluded that the weight of his body on top of her was the only force applied."
Id. But cf. Susan Estrich, Rape: A Question of Force, USA Today, Aug. 11, 1994,
at 13A (commenting that "[tihe body of a man who's 50 pounds heavier than you,
stronger than you, a more experienced fighter than you, ignoring your words,
determined to have sex, can certainly feel like force from the bottom"). In
response to the court's decision in Berkowitz, the Pennsylvania legislature
created the crime of sexual assault, a lesser offense than rape, which punishes
intercourse without consent. See supra notes 9 & 29.
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Some commentators have criticized opinions like
Alston and Berkowitz unequivocally, arguing that to say
that intercourse was nonconsensual, but not forcible,
"creates a paradox."' It is a "clear contradiction," Susan
Estrich explains, to conclude that "the woman was not
forced to engage in sex (as proven by her failure to resist),
but the sex she engaged in was against her will."'
Other commentators seem sympathetic at least with
the sentiment underlying Alston and Berkowitz, if not their
specific results. Although many of them endorse the
creation of a lesser offense for nonforcible, nonconsensual
intercourse, they believe that forcible, nonconsensual
intercourse is a more culpable act.'14 Advocating such a
two-tiered approach, Donald Dripps offers the following
explanation:
Physical violence in general does far more harm to the
victim's welfare than an unwanted sex act. Physical
violence in general expresses a more complete indifference,
or a more intense hostility, to the victim's humanity....
...[P]eople generally, male and female, would rather be
subjected to unwanted sex than be shot, slashed, or beaten
with a tire iron.... [W]hether measured by the welfare or
by the dignity of the victim, as a general matter unwanted
sex is not as bad as violence. I think it follows that those
who press sexual advances in the face of refusal act less

141. Estrich, supra note 4, at 62.
142. Id.; see also Henderson, supra note 4, at 158 (commenting that "it should
go without saying that if a woman does not want to engage in intercourse and is
not consenting, the man has to force her into the act"). A few judges have
likewise recognized this point. See, e.g., State v. Collins, 508 S.E.2d 390, 397 n.32
(Ga. 1998) (Hunstein, J., dissenting) (noting that "[flrom the victim's perspective,
where it is against her will to engage in sexual intercourse, the act occurs
necessarily by force; from the perpetrators perspective, where force must be used
to engage in sexual intercourse, the act is necessarily against the will of the
victim").
143. See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 105, 280; Dressler, supra note 10, at
423, 426; Dripps, supra note 2; McGregor, supra note 8,at 190.
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wickedly than those who shoot, or slash, or batter.'"

Others have criticized Dripps' characterization,
arguing that it "wildly misdescribes the experience of
rape,"145 and ignores the fact that all nonconsensual sex
creates an "injury to personal integrity"'146 and
"dehumanizes the victim" by violating the "autonomous
right to control one's own body" in "an area that is central
to one's identity and personhood.' ' 7 Robin West explains:
First, unwanted, undesired penetration of a woman who has
expressed a refusal, by a man who then ignores her refusal,
is a violent act. It is a physical intrusion of one's body, it
causes pain, and if that intrusion ...is non-violence, I'm not

sure I understand what violence is. Second, for the acts ...
to be successful, ... there must be an implied threat that

the man would use a very real weapon, namely, his fists....
[Elvery sexual act in which sex happens after a woman has
expressly refused it involves both the violence of the
unwanted penetration and the threat of further violence
should the woman refuse to cooperate. 48
The commentators who endorse a two-tiered approach
respond that treating forcible, nonconsensual intercourse
and nonforcible, nonconsensual intercourse equivalently
"trivializes the concept of forcible rape and the harm

144. Dripps, supra note 2, at 1792, 1800-01.
145. Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape,
93 Colum. L. Rev. 1442, 1448 (1993).
146. Estrich, supra note 4, at 103.
147. McGregor, supra note 8, at 191; see also Jane E. Larson, "Women
Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature 'Deceit'": A Feminist
Rethinking of Seduction, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 374, 453 (1993) (arguing that
"[iinvoluntariness is harmful in and of itself because it destroys autonomy and
choice").
148. Robin West, Men, Women and Rape, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 125, 150 (1994);
see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women's Autonomy, 69 Chi.Kent L. Rev. 359, 373, 371 (1993) (observing that "[florced sexual penetration is
itself a battery, resulting in physical and mental injuries," whereas "Dripps's
scheme denies any violence at all in the act of unwanted penetration"); West,
supra note 145, at 1448 (noting that "[f]rom the victim's perspective, unwanted
sexual penetration involves unwanted force, and unwanted force is violent").
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experienced by victims of the most violent rapes."149 But it
seems somewhat ironic to fault the suggestion that certain
types of rape should be taken seriously on the ground that

doing so "trivializes" the experience of other rape victims,
when the history of the law of rape has been to trivialize
the experience of rape victims generally. Moreover, the
experience of even "nonviolent" rape is terrifying and
causes substantial psychological harm. 150 Thus, as Dorothy
Roberts points out, creating distinctions between
"seemingly nonviolent sexual coercion" and "sex
accompanied by physical violence" tends to "obscure the
common nature of both."' 5 ' Although "there may well be a
difference" between forcible and nonforcible nonconsensual
intercourse, it is "not the difference between violent and
non-violent rape," but rather "[ilt is the difference between

lots of violence and not as much violence, or lots of force
and not much force."' 5 '
Despite the commentators' disagreement about the
appropriate level of punishment, many of them agree that

149. Dressier, supra note 10, at 423; see also Donald Dripps, Men, Women and
Rape, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 125, 162 (1994). Cf. Bryden, supra note 14, at 375
(maintaining that "lump[ing] together forcible and nonforcible offenders ... would
create the possibility of excessive sentences for the nonforcible rapes").
150. See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 279 (explaining that "unwanted sex
with an acquaintance tends to produce deep psychological harm, the victim may
suffer a lasting inability to trust those close to her, and her emotional distress
may persist as long as in the case of forcible rape by a stranger"); Roberts, supra
note 148, at 374 (observing that the "physical trauma and disregard of her
personhood that [the victim of nonconsensual intercourse] experienced is a form
of violence" that is no "less painful or degrading than if he had raised his fist");
West, supra note 148, at 151 ("At least if we are to believe the testimony of both
rape victims and crisis center workers, rape victims are always terrified, and
always terrified for their lives, and for a very simple reason: anyone who would so
trivialize you as to impose non-consensual sex is also capable of killing you."). Cf.
J.H. Bogart, Reconsidering Rape: Rethinking the Conceptual Foundations of Rape
Law, 8 Can. J.L. & Jurisprudence 159, 170 (1995) (pointing out that if the harm
suffered by the victim were a critical measure of culpability, a defendant who
raped "a victim of unusual resilience and strength with an unusually supportive
network" would receive a lighter sentence).
151. Roberts, supra note 148, at 381; see also West, supra note 148, at 159
(arguing that lenient treatment of nonconsensual, nonforcible rape "truly
trivializes the experience of the woman victimized during the event").
152. West, supra note 148, at 163.
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nonforcible, nonconsensual intercourse is deserving of
criminal sanction. As noted above," 3 however, the courts
have been hesitant to expressly endorse that viewpoint.
But the fact that they actually decide rape cases without
much analysis of defendants' mens rea vis-a-vis the force
requirement confirms that, at least implicitly, they
acknowledge that the issue of force is redundant and
therefore moot once lack of consent has been established.
In cases where courts are satisfied that the victim did not
consent, and the defendant had a culpable mens rea vis-avis that lack of consent, they have generally affirmed rape
convictions without paying much attention to questions of
force or the defendant's mens rea vis-a-vis force. And
rightly so. If the victim did not consent, and the defendant
nevertheless proceeded to have intercourse with her,
possessing the mens rea vis-a-vis her lack of consent
required in that jurisdiction to support a rape conviction,
15 4
he committed a culpable act that ought to be punished.

Acknowledging the primacy of nonconsent is also in
line with the policies underlying the prohibition of rape. As
the California Court of Appeal explained in People v.
Cicero:

[Tihe fundamental wrong at which the law of rape is aimed
is not the application of physical force that causes physical
harm. Rather, the law of rape primarily guards the
integrity of a woman's will and the privacy of her sexuality
153. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
154. In those jurisdictions that treat nonconsent as a matter of strict liability,
see supra note 17 and accompanying text, it is arguable that a rape conviction
ought not to be based solely on evidence that the victim did not consent to the
intercourse, without some indication that the defendant either used force or had a
culpable state of mind vis-a-vis her lack of consent. Absent a requirement of
express consent, however, it seems unlikely that a jury would find absence of
consent in a case involving evidence of neither force nor words or actions on the
victim's part that would have signaled to the defendant that she was not
consenting. Cf. Williams, supra note 15, at 15 (defending the House of Lords'
decision in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Morgan, [1976] App. Cas. 182, which
is described above in text accompanying notes 12-13, by observing that "if anyone
would have realised from what the woman said and did that she was not
consenting, then [the jurors] are entitled to conclude that the defendant realised
it").
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from an act of intercourse undertaken
consent.'55

without her

Therefore, the court concluded, "'force' merely plays a
supporting evidentiary role, as necessary only to insure an
act of intercourse has been undertaken against a victim's
will."15 6 In a similar vein, Patricia Falk has commentedsomewhat less charitably, but perhaps more realisticallythat the perception that a force requirement is needed in
order to "supply external evidence of nonconsent" is
probably based on "rampant, sexist distrust of rape
victims."

157

Whether one takes a more or less charitable view of
the motives underlying the criminal law's adoption of a
force requirement, the elements of force and nonconsent
are duplicative of one another. A woman who did not
consent to intercourse was, by definition, forced, and one
who was forced did not consent. By the same token, a
defendant who knew (or should have known) that the
victim did not consent also knew (or should have known)
155. 204 Cal. Rptr. 582, 590 (Ct. App. 1984); see also Rollin M. Perkins &
Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 198, 210 (3d ed. 1982) (noting that the English
common law definition of rape was "unlawful intercourse... without the consent
of the woman"; the "reference to force [in Blackstone's definition of rape] was not
found in the earlier definition given by Coke and its use has tended to cause
confusion rather than to clarify the law"). For Blackstone's definition of rape, see
supra text accompanying note 1.
156. Cicero, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 590 (advocating that the law of rape require "only
such force as is necessary reasonably to demonstrate that an act of intercourse
has been undertaken without the victim's consent").
157. Falk, supra note 23, at 155; see also Estrich, supra note 4, at 58 (observing
that "force has replaced consent or corroboration or unchastity as the primary
doctrinal rubric for expressing... distrust" of rape victims). For evidence
indicating that this distrust is misplaced, see People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 121
(Cal. 1986) (describing the impact of the criminal law's historic distrust of rape
victims and concluding that "previous expectational disparities, which singled out
the credibility of rape complainants as suspect, have no place in a modern system
of jurisprudence"); State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1273 (N.J. 1992) (citing
critics of "the stereotype that rape victims [are] inherently more untrustworthy
than other victims of criminal attack"); Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be
Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 1013, 1028 (1991) (criticizing the myth that rape victims are not
credible, and noting that "there is no empirical data to prove that there are more
false charges of rape than of any other violent crime").
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that he was forcing her to submit. Therefore, proof of either
lack of consent on the part of the victim or the use of force
on the part of the defendant-plus the accompanying mens
rea'--ought to suffice to support a rape conviction. And
the fact that courts routinely ignore questions of mens rea
and force, in contravention of the general criminal law
presumption that a mens rea requirement attaches to every
material element of the crime, demonstrates that they too
recognize, at least implicitly, that1 9 the traditional
160
"conjunction of force and nonconsent"

"indefensible,"

1

and

is "arbitrary,"

"redundant."62

158. While I believe that those who advocate requiring a mens rea of negligence
with respect to the element of nonconsent have the better argument, others
disagree. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text. But whatever mens rea
a particular jurisdiction chooses to apply to the element of nonconsent ought to
apply to the element of force as well, because essentially the same policy
considerations underlie both decisions.
159. Dripps, supra note 2, at 1792.
160. Id.
161. West, supra note 6, at 233.
162. MacKinnon, supra note 3, at 172.

